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Abstract 
 
The convergence of cellular and IP technologies has pushed the integration of 3G 
and WLAN networks to the forefront. With 3G networks’ failure to deliver feasible 
bandwidth to the customer and the emerging popularity, ease of use and high throughput 
of 802.11 WLANs, integrating secure access to 3G services from WLANs has become a 
primary focus. 3G user authentication initiated from WLANs has been defined by an 
enhancement to the extensible authentication protocol, EAP, used to transport user 
authentication requests over WLANs. The EAP-AKA protocol executes the 3G USIM 
user challenge and response authentication process over the IP backbone for WLAN 
serving networks. To improve the degree of control of 3G subscribers, spatial control has 
been proposed for 3G-WLAN user authentication. Successful execution of 3G security 
algorithms can be limited to a specified area by encrypting a user’s authentication 
challenge with spatial data defining his/her visited WLAN. With 3G networks’ limited 
capacity to determine a user’s location to the granularity of a small WLAN area and 
restricted access to users’ location due to privacy, 3G operators must rely on spatial data 
sent from visited WLANs to implement control for authentication. The risks of 
implementing EAP-AKA spatial control by 3G operators with no prior relationship or 
trust for serving WLAN networks are presented in this paper. An ad-hoc architecture is 
proposed for serving networks in 3G-WLAN integration and the advantages of this 
architecture that facilitate secure 3G user authentication are identified. Algorithms are 
proposed to define robust trust relationships between the parties in 3G-WLAN networks. 
The security of 3G user authentication is further protected by new mechanisms defined 























                                                          1
Introduction 
 
 Mobility is an ubiquitous quality currently expected by voice and data cellular 
customers. Seamless mobility and services have been successfully integrated into cellular 
networks over the past decade, but there is an increased demand for richer services by 
mobile customers that is presenting new challenges to the cellular industry. This demand 
for enhanced services has sparked the convergence between cellular and IP networks as 
cellular services stand to be improve by utilizing the capacity of the IP backbone to 
deliver rich user data. The challenges presented by the convergence of these the two 
networks are readily being addressed to facilitate the successful implementation of new 
mobile technology. Each network has been enhanced to provide both respective services, 
voice or data. Web data services have been integrated into 2G cellular networks with the 
introduction of the General Packet Radio Service, GPRS, and voice communications are 
now transported over IP networks using Voice-Over-IP encapsulation. These adapted 
data and voice services build the initial bridge between cellular and IP networks and 
deploy new technology layers for each respective network. IP and cellular networks 
differ fundamentally in infrastructure, communication protocols and properties and their 
convergence has become a technical research challenge. Designing hybrid cellular and IP 
access in integrated 3G and IP networks is the focus of this paper.  
 
The services and technology provided by cellular and IP networks differ 
significantly. Voice communications are optimally carried over cellular networks which 
provide limited bandwidth and high security, while data is carried over an optical IP 
backbone providing powerful bandwidth and limited security. Second generation cellular 
networks currently provides 9.6 Kb/s, with 3G networks carrying 100 Kb/s. This limited 
bandwidth is efficient for voice transmission, but is a significant obstacle to carrying rich 
data services to cellular customers. Our current IP backbone carries more than 40 Gb/s 
and provides a future conduit for transporting data services to 3G customers. Challenges 
exist, however, in that security protocols in the respective IP and 3G networks are not 
compatible in architecture or in the quality of integrity and protection provided. Detailed 
analysis of the operational differences between the two network technologies is required 
to successfully define a secure, merged cellular and IP environment. 
 
The most pending challenge of IP and cellular convergence is the secure and 
successful transport of 3G services over the IP backbone. Small wireless IP networks or 
WLANs are currently the most advantageous place to implement new merged cellular 
and IP access. Researchers have specified hybrid hardware to integrate 3G and WLAN 
networks as well as enhanced IP protocols to provide 3G network connectivity securely 
from IP WLANs. Relatively inexpensive deployment of hybrid WLANs providing access 
to 3G services will accelerate further convergence of IP and cellular networks. Gained 
access to enriched 3G cellular services from IP networks will become invaluable to 
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Merging 3G and Wireless IP Networks  
 
Cellular operators have recognized the opportunity to offer high-speed data 
services to their customers through rapidly evolving WLAN technology. Global technical 
consortiums have been formed to address the technical requirements and define 
specifications for emerging 3G-WLAN integration. The 3rd generation partnership 
project, 3GPP, has defined 6 scenarios for integrating 3G and WLAN networks [3]. 
These scenarios defining potential integrated operation and services include: 
? Scenario 1 – Common billing and customer care for WLAN and 3G 
operators. In this scenario, the customer receives one billing statement 
listing both 3G and WLAN usage and can contact one customer service 
center concerning both services. 
? Scenario 2 – 3G access control and charging is used for traditional internet 
services over the 3G network through a WLAN. Customers are 
authenticated by the 3G core network without a separate procedure.  
? Scenario 3 – Customers access 3G packet-switched services over a 
WLAN. These services include short messages service SMS, multimedia 
message service MMS, and IP multimedia subsystem service IMS. 
Customers will simultaneously but independently access WLAN and 3G 
networks. 
? Scenario 4 – Customers can change access between 3G and WLAN 
networks during a service session. A session is re-established without user 
involvement and service interruption during switching is allowed. 
? Scenario 5 – Seamless service switching between 3G and WLAN sessions. 
The user should not experience significant interruption during a handover. 
? Scenario 6 – Customers access 3G circuit-switched services over a 
WLAN. Seamless service switching is implemented. 
 
The scenario adopted by researchers for first stage 3G-WLAN deployment is Scenario 3. 
High-speed data services can be offered to customers with one subscription and one bill 
with limited or no change to the 3G network infrastructure. Scenario 3 is a less expensive 
initial approach requiring a minimum of investment from cellular operators. The 
succeeding scenarios will require hybrid hardware designed to process both 3G and 
WLAN physical layer protocols in order to implement seamless roaming and circuit-
switched services over WLANs. Implementing Scenario 3 is currently pursued since 
existing IP protocols can be enhanced to deliver high-speed services and access 3G 
billing and authentication systems via the public packet data IP backbone.  
 
The Broadband Radio Access Networks project, BRAN, within the European 
Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI, has additionally designed two options for 
internetworking GPRS, or the 2G packet service protocol over cellular networks, and 
WLAN networks [3]. These options define a tight coupling and loose coupling 
methodology for combined networking functionality. 
? Tight coupling – Requires full 3G security architecture, protocol stacks 
and interfaces are implemented in a WLAN system. New adaptation 
functions or components would be present in user equipment and access 
points to transport GPRS signaling, or 2G packet services, over 802.11 
WLANs networks. A 2G GPRS gateway would subsequently transfer 
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service requests onto the cellular network. 
? Loose coupling – A WLAN is deployed as an access network 
complimentary to a GPRS network. A WLAN utilizes the subscriber 
databases in the GPRS network, but implements no data interfaces to the 
GPRS core network. 
 
The most feasible option researched from the BRAN internetworking recommendations 
is the loose coupling design. Similar to the Scenario 3 internetworking option defined by 
3GPP, the public external packet network, or IP backbone, is accessed to perform 3G 
authentication and billing. Loose coupling offers a powerful advantage since new 
hardware communicating both GPRS and IEEE 802.11 protocols is not required.  
Defining enhanced, detailed access procedures for cellular customers accessing 3G 
services from a WLAN in a loosely coupled 3G and WLAN environment is the purpose  
of this paper. 
 
      3G Network Architecture  
 
The infrastructure of future 3G networks has evolved from the Global System for 
Mobile Communication, GSM, standard that defines existing cellular networks. As 
several different international bodies initiated designing 3G standards, the 3rd Generation 
Partnership Program, 3GPP, was established to create common 3G standards and ensure 
interoperability between new emerging wireless networks [14]. The Universal Mobile 
Telecommunications System, UMTS, defined by ETSI, is also a synonymous term 
defining new 3G cellular networks. The fundamental difference between UMTS and the 
existing GSM network architecture includes the introduction of a new WCDMA air 
interface between the user equipment and 3G cell base stations. WCDMA brings critical 
enhancements to the previous 2nd generation CDMA system such as allowing frequency 
reuse at adjacent cells, less multipath interference, and higher security for transmitted 
signals [14]. Migration from GSM to new UMTS networks primarily involves 
implementing new protocols over the air interface between users and cell base stations 
for WCDMA. All aspects of 3rd generation cellular networks and services are address by 
technical groups within 3GPP to deliver multiple service types, including voice, video 
and data, seamless customer roaming and enhanced secure cellular architecture. The 
detailed specifications for delivering secure 3G service to WLAN networks defined by 
the WLAN/Cellular Internetworking team within 3GPP is the focus for this study.  
 
3G network components are the User Equipment, UE, several Access Networks, 
AN, and a Core Network, CN. 3G user equipment connects with an access network over 
a radio air interface via a Base Transceiver Station or BTS. The area covered by a base 
transceiver station is defined as a 3G cell. The Access Network is comprised of a group 
of cells and their base transceiver stations which are managed by a Base Station 
Controller, BSC. The BSC provides the interface to the 3G core network which executes 
switching, routing and management processes for user applications and acts as a gateway 
to external networks. The core network provides access to centralized components and 
functions to maintain users’ location data, build authentication and session keys for 
secure network use and maintain usage data for customer billing and charging. 
Authentication and session keys are built using a subscriber’s secret key Ki which is 
stored within the Universal Subscriber Identity Module, USIM, inside the user 
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equipment. A user’s secret key, Ki, is shared with the 3G core network and each user is 
identified by the 3G core network by his/her International Mobile Subscriber Identity, 
IMSI, which is also stored in the USIM.  
 
 Existing GSM networks were enhanced to service both voice and data user 
requests by adding access to Packet Switched services along with the original voice 
Circuit Switched services [14]. This enhanced GSM network employs the General Packet 
Radio Service to transport data over the user’s air interface and allows access to simple 
data services such as Web access, or e-mail. The 3G core network required updating to 
transport Packet Switched services between user cells and a second distinct interface was 
















       Figure 1   3G Core Network Components 
  
Switching is accomplished in the core network for circuit switched connections by a 
Mobile Switching Center, MSC. For packet switched services, a Serving GPRS Support 
Node, SGSN, provides access to the 3G core network for users. Both entities access a 
Visitor Location Register to query current subscriber mobility and authentication data. 
The VLR accesses the 3G Home Location Register database containing the permanent 
identity of the user, IMSI, and the user’s shared secret key for authentication. 
Connections between the 3G HLR and VLR are maintained to manage persistent services 
as the user moves throughout the network. The HLR maintains a mobile user’s current 
MSC or SGSN association so to know where to route data packets or calls to users.  
A MSC also maintains access to a Gateway Mobile Switching Center, GMSC, which 
provides connectivity to external CS networks [14]. Access to external PS networks is 
provided by a Gateway GPRS Support Node, GGSN, which serves as a gateway for 3G 
users. The SGSN is unique from the MSC in that it performs routing of user data packets 
rather than voice calls and integrates the functionality of a VLR to maintain current 
subscriber information.  
 
      802.11 Wireless LAN Architecture 
 
 Traditional fixed IP networks have been extended to allow user mobility in small  
wireless local networks. With the implementation of IEEE 802.11 radio-based 
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communication standards, IP networking within small wireless areas allows mobile users 
to access data and applications hosted by fixed local servers. 802.11 WLANs also 
provide mobile users gateway access to external IP networks, primarily the public 
Internet. IP connectivity is implemented over a wireless area by use of dynamic IP 
addressing, or DHCP, which provided users a temporary IP address while they are 
accessing a WLAN. Both private and public WLANs have been implemented in which 
user authentication is required to gain network access or users access a WLAN as guests, 
respectively. WLAN Access Points, AP, transmit all IP packets between the WLAN user 
and application servers or gateways and allow users the freedom to move within the area 
covered by a WLAN. Simple, inexpensive WLANs have been integrated in popular 
facilities serving the public, such as airports or arenas, primarily to provide users with 
Internet access. This quick adoption of IEEE 802.11 WLAN technology has thus become 
a focal point for delivering converged 3G and IP network access.  
 
 A WLAN is comprised of several cells, similar to a 3G radio network, in which 
networking functions are accomplished by a fixed infrastructure or implemented by an 
ad-hoc architecture. With a fixed WLAN infrastructure, each cell is serviced by a Base 
Station, BS, or Access Point, AP. A network distribution system, typically Ethernet, 
connects all access points together and connects the WLAN to application servers and 
network gateways. Each cell is designated as a Basic Service Set by the 802.11 standard, 
while an entire WLAN, including all cells, access points, and distribution system is 
designated as an Extended Service Set [4]. Access point functionality is defined by the 
Distributed Coordination Function, DCF, which provides CSMA/CA access to wireless 
media equally between users. A Point Coordination Function is optionally implemented 
in WLAN access points to provide prioritized time-bounded services, such as voice or 
video. Power saving is implemented in user equipment employing an 802.11 interface  
allowing mobile stations to go into sleep mode while designated packets are buffered at 
the station’s AP. Mobility management is accomplished in a WLAN as each user builds 
an association with his/her nearest access point serving the BSS in which she is located. 
Mobility becomes transparent in wireless LANs as users travel between cells and 
associate with different access points. Seamless connectivity is maintained without any 
















                            Figure 2   802.11 Wireless LAN 
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not use this functionality of fixed access points, but participating nodes are required to 
communicate with each other and build relationships so to carry out WLAN 
functionality.  
 
To gain access to a WLAN, the user equipment must first acquire synchronization 
information concerning that wireless network. This is accomplished by the user 
equipment either passively scanning its nearest access point to wait to receive a 
Beacon Frame or actively probing access points by sending a Probe Request. Beacon 
frames contain the value of an AP’s clock at the time of transmission and are used by a 
mobile client to learn an AP’s transmission schedule. Once the user equipment has found 








                            Figure 3   802.11 Client Authentication Process 
 
A DHCPDISCOVER broadcast message is sent by the mobile client containing its MAC 
hardware address to find a DHCP server on the WLAN. Once a request for an IP address 
is received, the DHCP server responds with a DHCPOFFER message containing an 
available address and configuration parameters. The mobile station accepts the temporary 
address by sending a DHCPREQUEST message to the server which acknowledges to the 
client with a DHCPACK message. The mobile station’s assigned IP address and MAC 
address are forwarded to the WLAN authentication server in order to initiate 
authentication. Authentication and association must be completed before the user is 
allowed to transmit or receive any data frames within the WLAN. Security is 
implemented in WLANs so to prevent unauthorized access to private network resources 
and to protect the privacy and integrity of transmitted user data. 
 
      3G-WLAN Integrated Architecture 
 
Fundamentally different approaches have been defined to integrate 3G and 802.11 
WLAN networks. The tight coupling approach defines development of enhanced 
hardware that integrates processing of 3G physical layer protocols in 802.11 networks 
[3]. This new hardware accessing the GPRS network will manage subscriber mobility 
and user sessions for WLAN users. The Loose coupling approach, conversely, allows for 
access to the 3G core network from within WLANs without fully implementing 3G 
protocol processing in existing 802.11 network equipment [9]. New protocols for the 
public IP backbone have been designed to implement 3G user management for users of 
potential WLAN areas. The accurate implementation of 3G-WLAN internetworking 
providing secure access to 3G services from WLANs is essential to the successful 
convergence of these network technologies.  
 
Integrating 3G and WLAN networks requires dual mode user equipment 
possessing both wireless transceivers, 3G and IEEE 802.11. Dual mode user equipment is 
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currently available to subscribers and will be the standard for the future. An example of a  
tight coupling internetworking approach requires an enhancement to 3G core network 
hardware so that SGSN nodes can process 802.3 MAC frames transmitted from the 
distribution system of a WLAN. A GRPS Internetworking Function, GIF, defines the 
capability to process both 802.3 and 3G MAC layer protocols making the SGSN unaware 
of the type of network from which the 3G user’s packets originated [3]. A WLAN 
adaptation function, or WAF, would provide internetworking at the SGSN by translating 
802.3 MAC frames into GPRS MAC frames [3]. Additionally, user equipment would be 
enhanced with the WAF to encapsulate 802.11 MAC into 3G Logical Link Control 
PDUs. The required 3G and IEEE 802 protocols that these new hardware components 
will process are diagramed and described below. 
 
                                   
                Figure 4   Protocol Architecture for Tight Coupling 
  
              PHY G.703/704 physical communication in the core network 
              RLC  Radio Link Control in user cellular equipment 
              FR Full Rate voice encoder for speech transmission in the core network 
              NS Network Service indicating congestion in the core network 
              BSSGP Base Station Subsystem GPRS Protocol transports MAC layer functional information to  
                             the core network from a base station 
              SNDCP Sub-network Dependent Convergence protocol performs compression, multiplexing and  
                             segmentation 
 
In this tight coupling internetworking example, both 3G network and user 
equipment must be enhanced to encapsulate 3G and 802.11 physical, PHY, and media 
access control, MAC, protocols. The benefits of this tight coupled internetworking 
approach are that full 3G functionality is accessible from a visited WLAN network. 3G 
users are authenticated and initiate sessions by utilizing currently defined processes and 
protocols implemented within the 3G standards. This example demonstrates how quality 
and integrity of current 3G mobility and user management procedures are not disrupted 
by a tightly coupled implementation. The following diagram depicts a tightly coupled 
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network in which a WLAN interfaces directly to the 3G core network via newly defined 
inter-networking functions and hardware [3]. 
      



















                           
                           Figure 5   3G-WLAN Integration with Tight Coupling 
 
However, the drawback of this integration approach is the cost associated with designing 
and manufacturing new infrastructure and user hardware. All Serving GPRS Support 
Nodes, SGSN, would require integration of new firmware to provide access to the 3G 
core network from 802.3 networks. Additionally, current user equipment would need to 
be enhanced with the functionality to communicate low level 3G protocols over WLANs.  
 
A loose coupling approach has been adopted by researchers and industry leaders 
to mitigate these potential obstacles associated with deploying new dually enabled 3G 
and 802.11 hardware. Potential 3G-WLAN integration can be implemented with the 
approach that a WLAN is treated as a publicly visited network that stands complementary 
to the 3G core network. Authentication and session management is performed for WLAN 
users requesting 3G access via new protocols transported over the IP backbone to the 3G 
core network without accessing the 3G radio transport network. New protocols are 
required to deploy a loose coupled integrated network, but a significant benefit of this 
internetworking option is that no low level protocol processing needs to be integrated into 
existing network or user hardware. Figure 6 highlights a WLAN network’s access to the 
3G core network through the IP backbone [3]. This loose coupling integration allows 
faster deployment of hybrid 3G-WLAN access networks and deserves careful study as to 
how to effectively implement 3G user policies and procedures for WLAN users. User 
authentication, session key agreement, and billing procedures will be issued over the IP 
backbone versus traditional 3G access networks. It is critical that the design of these IP 
protocols preserve the quality of existing 3G protocols and that the potential security 
risks of 3G-WLAN integration are identified and resolved.  
                                                          9
          
                             Figure 6   3G-WLAN Integration with Loose Coupling 
 
      3G Security Architecture 
 
 Current cellular network security procedures have been redesigned for future 3rd 
generation networks. Existing procedures implement authentication, key agreement and 
data encryption between the user equipment and cellular network. The 3G security 
protocol provides enhanced authentication and has been designed to answer weaknesses 
in the existing 2G security protocol. The 3G security architecture defines mutual 
authentication between the user and cellular network, new encryption algorithms and 
better freshness of user cipher and integrity keys. Security algorithms have further been 
enhanced by the use of longer keys to create stronger user authentication and data 
encryption.  
 
 In 3rd generation authentication procedures, each subscriber is identified by 
his/her unique International Mobile Subscriber Identity, IMSI, which is stored in the 
USIM module within the user’s equipment and at the 3G HLR database. Each subscriber 
is assigned a unique 128-bit secret key, Ki, which is stored in the user’s SIM and 3G 
authentication center, AuC. All authentication algorithms are performed internally in the 
user’s SIM and at the 3G AuC using the 128-bit subscriber key Ki. 3G encryption 
algorithms used to create a user’s authentication challenge, integrity, confidentiality keys 
and network authentication code are significantly strengthened by the use of the Rijndael 
AES block cipher algorithm. The AES block cipher can be customized by 3G operators 
who are allowed to set 10 intermediate constants c1-c5, r1-r used as variables by the 
algorithm plus set a 128-bit operator specific variant configuration field, OP [5]. With an 
order of 1021 times more AES 128-bit keys than the 56-bit keys of 2G DES encryption, 
AES key recovery using current key-exhausting algorithms is considered unachievable. 
 
3G user authentication occurs when a user’s equipment is initially powered on 
and subsequently performed as user moves throughout the 3G access network or 
                                                          10
performs a service request. As a cellular user travels through his/her provider’s network, 
low level connections are maintained between the user and 3G core network. A user’s 
VLR/SGSN will communicate with the cellular core network updating the user’s current 
location and session information at the core network. The area serviced by a VLR is 
designated as a Location Area, LA, or a Routing Area, RA. As a user’s LA/RA changes, 
he will be prompted for re-authentication by his new VLR or SGSN. 
 
However, inter-SGSN RA updates do not necessarily prompt user re-
authentication as defined by 3G policies [14]. A user’s current location is stored by the 
3G HLR in the form of a Location Area Identifier, LAI, which is used to uniquely 
identify a LA. A LAI is comprised of a 3 digit Mobile Country Code, MCC, 2-3 digit 
Mobile Network Code and 2 byte Location Area Code [14]. Furthermore, in order for a 
user’s MSC/SGSN to be able to route calls or packets to a user located within an LAI, a 2 
byte Cell Identity, CI, is appended to a user’s LAI to distinguish what is the user’s current 
cell. 
When a user’s current VLR/SGSN changes, a mobility management location 
update request is initiated by the new VLR/SGSN to the 3G core network [14]. User 
mobility management is executed via the MM protocol to exchange data to the cellular 
core network notifying a mobile user’s present location and subscription information.  
 
                      
                                       Figure 7   3G Location Update Procedure 
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The user’s current location is carried from the core network to a central cellular database 
or Home Location Register, HLR, by the MAP/D protocol, upon entry to a new location 
area service by a different VLR/SGSN. The HLR database located within cellular 
headquarters stores private user management data, including user identity and secret 
subscriber key. Entry into a new location area serviced by a different VLR/SGSN 
prompts user re-authentication to the 3G network. Once a user’s location has been 
updated to the HLR, the MAP/D carries authentication credentials back to the 
VLR/SGSN from an Authentication Center, AuC, to re-authenticate the user. The 
following sequence diagram illustrates the MM and MAP/D protocol exchanges as a user 
travels into a new location area. 
 
To generate user authentication credentials, the 3G HLR will retrieve the 
respective user’s secret key Ki from the AuC. The HLR generates a 128-bit random 
number, RAND, and uses the random number as an input value to obtain the user’s 
expected authentication response, SRES, integrity and confidentiality keys, IK, CK and a 
network authentication code, AUTN. The HLR will send a set of authentication quintets 
composed of {RAND, SRES, IK, CK, AUTN} for the user to the requesting VLR/SGSN 
[14]. The VLR will choose an authentication quintet for the user and forward the 
authentication challenge, RAND, and network authentication code, AUTN to the user.  
 
Executing the same authentication algorithms within his/her SIM, utilizing his/her 
secret 128-bit key, Ki, and received RAND challenge, the user will first authenticate the 
3G network. The network authentication code, AUTN, is constructed using the user’s 
sequence value, SQN, which is kept current within the user’s SIM and 3G HLR database.                      
The user’s sequence number is encapsulated by the user’s anonymity key AK, and 
                  














                                                  Figure 8   3G Security Algorithms 
 
appended with an authentication management field, AMF, and message authentication 
code, MAC to create the AUTN. Upon receipt of a network authentication code, the user 
will calculate the expected MAC for the message, XMAC, based on his SQN and Ki and 
the received AMF and RAND. If the calculated XMAC equals the received MAC and the 
received SQN is number within an accepted range of the user’s stored SQN, the 
authentication challenge is accepted by the user equipment. Otherwise the user will send 
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an user authentication reject message back to the VLR/SGSN and abandon the procedure 
[14]. The user can also send a resynchronization request message to the VLR/SGSN 
prompting an exchange between user equipment and HLR to acquire user SQN 
synchronization. 
 
At successful verification of the 3G network, the user SIM will generate and send 
an authentication response, RES, back to the VLR/SGSN. Upon verification of the 
equivalence of the RES received from the user and the SRES present in the chosen HLR 
authentication quintet, the VLR/SGSN will notify the user of authentication success [14]. 
The VLR/SGSN then forwards the cipher and integrity keys, CK and IK, from the chosen 
HLR authentication quintet to the user. Upon successful authentication, a user will regain 
secure access to the cellular network utilizing session keys assigned by the AuC to 
protect user confidentiality and data integrity. This enhanced authentication process is 
diagramed in Figure 9. 
 
The 3G security architecture builds mutual authentication between the user and 
3G network, and implements strict user data confidentiality and integrity. However, user 
privacy must be maintained as he/she interacts with the 3G network. Additional security 
is required to protect the real identity of users and to disallow tracking of users’ mobility. 
A temporary mobile subscriber identity, TMSI, assigned by a user’s VLR/SGSN, is used 
over the cellular access network to protect the real identity and privacy of mobile users 
[14]. Primarily, any association between a user’s location and subscription management 
data and his/her true identity, IMSI, is disallowed. Use of temporary identities, TMSI, 













                         
 
 
                          Figure 9   3G User Authentication Process 
 
an eavesdropping party. A user’s temporary identity is assigned at re-authentication or 
entry into a new location area and is valid for the time the user is active within that 
location area. A packet TMSI, P-TMSI, is the equivalent temporary id assigned to a user 
connected to the packet core network via an SGSN. Once a user has re-authenticated to 
the cellular network and ciphering becomes enabled, a new TMSI is allocated and sent to 
the user by his VLR/SGSN. Sent in encrypted format, the new TMSI cannot be 
associated with the subscriber. The core cellular network identifies a user by his/her             
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             Figure 10   3G Temporary User Identity Assignment 
 
TMSI for all following subscription management procedures. The allocation of 
temporary identities is diagramed above. 
 
      802.11 WLAN Security 
  
 Security over 802.11 wireless networks poses more risks than traditional wired 
networks since wide physical areas are made available to many potential users. Initial 
802.11 WLAN security implemented entity authentication and data encryption defined by 
the Wired Equivalent Privacy standard, WEP. Entity authentication included open system 
and shared key authentication. A WLAN access point would grant access to anyone that 
requested it in open system authentication, while shared key authentication depended on 
a secret key being shared between the requestor and authenticator. A secret key would be 
used to encrypt the authentication challenge received from an access point by a user 
requesting access to a WLAN. If the access point could successfully decrypt the correct 
challenge using the user’s secret key, access was granted. Data integrity and privacy 
implemented in WLANs was initially implemented using the 40-bit stream cipher RC4 
algorithm. The 802.11 standard, WEP, supported static predefined shared keys for data 
encryption transmitted between access points and user equipment. Initial WLAN security 
was easily breached and the vulnerabilities presented prompted the redesign of WLAN 
security algorithms. For instance, if an open system authentication was filtered by an 
access list of legitimate user equipment MAC addresses, access could be easily acquired 
by an eavesdropper that captured MAC addresses sent in clear text over the WLAN [15]. 
This vulnerability also existed for WLANs that limited access to users possessing 
knowledge of the WLAN server set ID, SSID, used to uniquely identify WLAN 
networks. With SSIDs broadcasted in clear text by serving access points, maintaining 
controlled access to a WLAN became threatened. Additionally, shared key authentication 
algorithms were vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks in which a clear authentication 
response and the corresponding cipher text could be captured by an eavesdropper [15]. 
With the possession of both the clear and cipher text pair, an attacker could successfully 
derive a user’s shared key.  Initial WLAN security also required difficult configuration 
since authentication keys could be integrated into user 802.11 WLAN adapters. The loss 
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or theft of a user’s adapter created vulnerability for a WLAN and significant management 
challenges to the operator. 
 
The 802.11i standard was introduced to enhance existing WLAN security. The 
goal of the 802.11i standard is to define robust security network associations so that all 
relationships between parties are built on strong authentication and association, or RSNA 
[8]. The 802.11X framework is integrated into 802.11i to deliver authentication services 
and key management. The new framework answers the initial weakness of WLAN 
authentication, implements stronger encryption algorithms and provides dynamic session 
key management incorporating a four-way handshake. 802.11X defines the components 
of a WLAN as supplicants, authenticators or authentication servers by the 802.11i 
standard. A supplicant is the mobile node requesting WLAN access and the authenticator 
represents the network access server, which in WLANs are access points. The 
authentication server is a new component implemented into 802.11 security and is either 
a RADIUS or DIAMAETER access server. The 802.11X framework is port-based in 
which a port is defined between the supplicant and authenticator. All traffic is blocked for 
an existing port, except 802.11X messages, until a supplicant is authenticated. Several 
mutual authentication schemes are available for WLAN authentication, i.e. MD5, TLS, 
EAP-SIM, with the Extensible Authentication Protocol, EAP, employed for transporting 
authentication messages between the supplicant and authentication server. Improving 
upon the weak entity authentication and static shared key authentication defined by 
802.11, the 802.11X framework authenticates the WLAN user and allows the user to 
mutually authenticate the WLAN network eliminating man-in-the-middle attacks from 
false access points.  
                
                                      Figure 11   WLAN Man In the Middle Attack 
 
RSN information elements carry security information indicating authentication 
and cipher algorithms the parties will use for WLAN communication. Mobile nodes and 
WLAN access points learn of the security capabilities of their peers via RSN IE messages 
and negotiate as to which security suite to use. The 802.11 weakness of an attacker 
deriving WEP RC4 initialization values has been resolved by the introduction of a 128-
bit temporal key algorithm, TKIP. The temporal key, TK, is a shared secret key between 
the user and authentication server that is built from a client’s MAC address to ensure key 
uniqueness between mobile users. The communicating parties must ensure that no 
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initialization vector, IV, is used more than once for a current TK. The shared TK is 
updated before the full 48-bit IV space is exhausted to ensure robust IV use. TKIP also 
implements packet sequence counters such that out-of-order packets are dropped to 
prevent replay attacks. Since TKIP employs the older RC4 stream cipher, the 802.11i 
standard includes a second encryption option to utilize new advanced encryption 
standards. 802.11i defines the CCMP algorithm using the AES CCM mode with a 128-bit 
key and 128-bit block size of operation.[8] CCM employs AES counter-mode, CTR, to 
encrypt packet payload and cipher-block chaining, CBC-MAC, to build message 
authentication codes to provide message integrity and confidentiality. A fresh TK is 
required for each session and packet numbers, PN, are implemented to prevent replay 
attacks. 
 
      3G-WLAN Security Architecture 
 
 Implementing 3G authentication over the IP backbone is critical to rapidly and 
inexpensively merge 3G and WLAN networks. Basic functions for subscriber 
management performed by 3G network hardware must be accessible to users within 
WLANs desiring access to 3G services. User authentication must be implemented 
successfully using the IP backbone to allow 3G network access from popular, visited 
WLANs. Proxy functions integrated into existing servers have been identified to facilitate 
3G subscriber management and serve as the critical connection between WLAN and 3G 
networks. 
 
Placement of 3G Authentication, Authorization and Accounting services within  
loosely coupled 3G-WLAN networks has been defined to implement the integrity of 3G 
user security over WLANs. These 3G AAA servers will communicate with counterpart 
AAA proxies integrated within visited WLANs. AAA servers will access the core 
network HLR so to initiate 3G user authentication for WLAN users. Requests for 
authentication will be transported between WLAN AAA proxies and 3G AA servers via 
an enhanced IP transport protocol. The transport protocol EAP, or Extensible 
Authentication Protocol, define for 802.11 WLANs, has been extended to service 3G  
                          
                         








   
 
             
              Figure 12   3GPP-WLAN Internetworking Architecture 
 
SIM-based authentication exchanges initiated from WLANs [8]. The EAP extension 
defined for transporting the 3G Authentication and Key Agreement procedure to and 
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from a WLAN is designated EAP-AKA. The sequence of events occurring during the 
EAP-AKA process is diagramed in Figure 13.  
 
Upon entry to a WLAN, a 3G-WLAN AAA proxy will prompt the user for his 3G 
user identity. A WLAN user will identify himself to the AAA proxy via a Network 
Access Identifier, NAI, composed of a username and realm or network name delimited 
by the @ sign. Aliases are allowed for the username portion of the NAI to protect 3G 
user privacy while he/se visits a WLAN [1]. The EAP authentication request is then 
forwarded to a AAA server within the 3G home network. The 3G HSS is notified of the 
user’s authentication request and prompts the HLR to generate 3G authentication vectors 
to be transported back to the 3G AAA server. The HSS, Home Subscriber Server, has 
been designed for 3G-WLAN integration and provides connectivity to a subset of 
services performed by the 3G HLR [5]. Upon receipt of a WLAN user’s authentication 
vector, the 3G AAA server performs the responsibilities traditionally delegated to a 3G 
VLR/SGSN by sending an authentication challenge, RAND, and network authentication 
code, AUTN, to the WLAN user. Upon the user’s successful authentication of the 3G 
network using the AUTN code and sending his/her correct challenge response to the 
AAA server, the user will be notified of his/her successful authentication and allowed 
access to 3G services. 3G authentication algorithms, present only at the 3G core and user 
equipment USIM, that apply the user's unique secure key Ki to create 128-bit 
authentication credentials are used by the EAP-AKA protocol to authenticate a 3G user             
from within a WLAN [5]. 
    Figure 13   AKA Procedure between 3GPP and WLAN Networks 
 
Successful implementation of the EAP-AKA protocol relies on secure transport of 
EAP packets between a WLAN AAA proxy and 3G AAA sever. The EAP protocol, 
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initially designed to implement 802.11 WLAN user authentication, details a transport 
mechanism to transfer user authentication challenges and responses between a WLAN 
and a remote authentication server. A secure peer relationship is created between WLAN 
AAA proxies and 3G AAA servers so to successfully transport EAP authentication 
payloads over the IP backbone using the DIAMETER transport application [11, 12]. 3G 
user authentication challenges and responses are transferred from a 3G AAA server to a 
WLAN via the Diameter-EAP-Request and Answer messages, DER and DEA. These 
messages include components to initiate a unique session between the WLAN AAA 
prosy and 3G AAA server. The participating WLAN AAA proxy is identified by an 
Origin-Host and Origin-Realm name and the targeted 3G AAA server is designated by 
Destination-Host and Destination-Realm within the Diameter messages. 
 
     <Diameter-EAP-Request> ::= < Diameter Header> 
                                           < Session-Id > 
                                      { Auth-Application-Id } 
                                          { Origin-Host } 
                                        { Origin-Realm } 
                                      { Destination-Realm } 
                                      { Auth-Request-Type } 
                                                       { EAP-Payload } 
 
The EAP-Payload encapsulates the EAP packets when transferred between a WLAN and 
3G AAA proxy and server. To protect 3G user authentication, DIAMETER exchanges 
are encrypted by implementing either IP security, IPSec, or IP transport layer security, 
TLS. The relationship of DIAMETER clients and servers within a 3G-WLAN integrated 
network is diagrammed below.  
 
 
                 Figure 14   DIAMETER Protocol between WLAN and 3GPP Network  
 
The DIAMETER protocol ensures that EAP-AKA authentication requests are initiated 
from an acceptable peer. The vulnerability that EAP-AKA requests are forged from a 
non-DIAMETER capable node is eliminated by the required relationship between 3G-
WLAN AAA servers and proxies. To ensure EAP messages are not manipulated when 
transferred between 3GPP and WLAN networks, the Cryptographic Message Syntax 
(CMS) is implemented by DIAMETER to detect fraudulent proxies that may modify data 
within messages [13].  
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Once authenticated from within a WLAN, services provided over the 3G private 
network will be accessible to subscribers. Example services include Multimedia 
Messaging Service, MMS, and 3GPP IP Multimedia Subsystems, IMS. Tunneling will be 
additionally employed between the 3G private IP network and WLANs to deliver user 
packets securely. Routing contingencies are also available so that if a WLAN access 
network can not route packets to the 3G home network, user equipment can learn and 
choose from WLANs capable of routing to his/her 3G provider [5]. Charging information 
will be collected for a WLAN user as data packets are routed through the 3G owner's 
private network. This 3G-WLAN integrated infrastructure creates opportunities for 
sharing rich integrated data and voice services to mobile users. The maturity of 3G-
WLAN integration creates significant value for future networks. 
 
      Risk Analysis of 3GPP-WLAN Security  
 
Potential vulnerabilities presented by 3G-WLAN network integration in a loosely 
coupled architecture must be defined. The merging of 3G and WLAN networks will 
prompt a higher volume of delivered rich data services and access to sensitive user data 
over wireless networks. Interactive video and conferencing will increase and the access to 
sensitive corporate data and files will be available over 3G-WLAN networks. With richer 
services and sensitive, valuable user and business data accessible from more wireless 
access networks, the risk of dishonest attempts for access will increase. The different 
types of threats presented to the 3G home network providing access to services from 
WLANs include:  
? illegal access to 3G services  
? prevention of access to 3G services  
? unauthorized access to 3G user data  
 
The purpose of this paper is to define algorithms that minimize the threat of illegal access 
to 3G networks from WLANs. The transport of EAP-AKA authentication requests over 
the IP network introduces a new threat to 3G networks. The IP backbone is a partial mesh 
network of which the origin or validity of an EAP-AKA authentication request may not 
be readily verified by the 3G core network. An attacker may impersonate a valid user by 
requesting EAP-AKA authentication from a WLAN that results in the victim being 
charged with the attacker’s illegal usage of services. An attacker can successfully 
impersonate a valid user if he possesses knowledge of a user’s IMSI and subscriber key, 
Ki, and creates falsified EAP-AKA authentication messages. This form of illegal access 
is particularly dangerous to 3G networks since is can be performed remotely over the 
Internet with the attacker not physically present in a WLAN. The prior “open” 
environment of WLAN networks, in which messages from access points are sent in clear 
text to users, also poses a threat to 3G services access in which an attacker can steal a 
user’s MAC/IP address combination and access a user’s wireless session. With the 
current 3G-WLAN security architecture, the 3G home network gains limited knowledge 
or warning of illegitimate activities or behavior of users within the WLAN.  
 
The potential threat to 3G networks that provide service access to WLANs is 
significantly impacted from the mixed, different ownership of the integrated wireless 
networks. Authentication for traditional 3G network access originating, from 3G owned 
cells, is initiated and executed by secure 3G VLR/SGSN nodes. Authentication vectors 
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travel through strict paths within the 3G hierarchical infrastructure to the user’s active 
location area where user authenticated is performed. The home network can trust that 
invalid 3G authentication requests have not been interjected into the cellular radio access 
network. Unlike security initiated from a 3G cell, however, WLAN access networks may 
not be an extension of 3G access networks and may be owned by different operators. 
Furthermore, the 3G operator may possess no knowledge or relationship with potential 
WLAN owners. It is essential that the 3G home network gain knowledge of the integrity 
of WLAN partners so to prevent abusive access to 3G service access. The 3G network 
may be unaware if an EAP-AKA request is interjected illegally via a dishonest user 
connecting to a WLAN AAA proxy. Additionally, the 3G home network is vulnerable if 
the WLAN operator initiates invalid authentication requests on behalf of a dishonest 
attacker. This paper presents security algorithms that enable the 3G home network to gain 
robust assessments of WLAN networks and their EAP-AKA security performance. 
Algorithms are proposed that enable the 3G home network to protect itself from illegal 
authentications originating from IP serving networks or WLANs. The 3G home network 
can exercise these new security mechanisms to verify the authenticity of EAP-AKA 
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Enhanced EAP-AKA Security Protocol 
 
      Authentication Control in EAP-AKA Protocol 
 
The EAP-AKA process must be enhanced so to eliminate unauthorized access to 
3G networks and services from WLANs. It is beneficial to control 3G authentication, 
initiated from a WLAN, in such a way that it can only be successfully completed by an 
intended recipient or within the intended WLAN access network. This can be 
accomplished by encrypting EAP-AKA authentication vectors such that successful 
decryption is dependent on knowledge of user specific data, additional to the user’s 
unique key Ki, or user location. For instance, the following 3G user state information can 
be used to encrypt a user’s EAP-AKA authentication challenge so that it can only be 
deciphered by the intended user. Encryption can be accomplished by XORing the user’s 
authentication challenge with the following state data prior to forwarding the challenge to 
the user’s WLAN: 
 
? user’s current LAI or CGI  
? user’s current TMSI 
? user’s current SQN 
? user’s equipment serial number 
 
Upon receipt of the XORed authentication challenge, a user must extract the 
original challenge before proceeding with SIM-based authentication processing. These 
bits of data are very powerful in limiting 3G authentication to a targeted subscriber that 
requests access to services over an IP network. The risk of a 3G user’s identity being 
forged via a dishonest EAP-AKA authentication request can be mitigated using this 
approach. However, the 3G user state data listed does not provide the strongest protection 
for controlling 3G-WLAN authentication. For instance, a LAI/CGI assignment is static 
data that can be obtained by an intelligent attacker who determines the location area a 
vulnerable WLAN resides in. A user’s authentication sequence number, SQN, is not 
unique between users, requires synchronization between the user equipment and 3G core 
network and is only a 48-bit value which creates the opportunity for attackers to derive 
the key using a brute-force method. Encryption using a user equipment serial number 
requires an added protocol exchange at the 3G home network between the HLR and EIR 
which is currently implemented on a limited basis. Furthermore, the 3G core network is 
not aware of user’s current TMSI since it is assigned and stored at the user’s current 
VLR/SGSN.  
 
      Spatial Control in EAP-AKA Protocol 
 
A feasible option for enhancing 3G-WLAN security is to limit successful 
authentication to a targeted area in which a user resides such that the authentication 
challenge can be responded to from that area only. Controlling where successful 
authentication can be executed provides a more robust approach to protecting 3G service 
access initiated from WLANs. EAP-AKA authentication credentials can be encrypted so 
that successful application requires physical occupancy within a targeted specific area. 
For instance, a 128-bit Area Descriptor, AD, defining an area within a WLAN can be 
used to encrypt a user’s authentication challenge. The challenge can only be decrypted 
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and used from within the limited target area defined by the AD. 3G user authentication 
architecture can be readily enhanced to implement spatial control of 3G-WLAN user 
authentication. Both the user equipment and 3G home network hold the knowledge 
required to build the user’s current area descriptor which can be used to encrypt the 
user’s authentication challenge. With a user’s 3G home network determining an area 
descriptor ADHN for the user, the user’s authentication challenge RAND can then be 
encrypted using some function F() to produce RANDAD [6].  
 
 ADHN ^ RAND = RANDAD.            (1) 
 
Upon receipt of his authentication challenge, the user can decrypt RANDAD using the 
same function F() and his own defined area descriptor, ADUE, as a key. 
 
ADUE ^ RANDAD = RAND.            (2) 
 
3G SIM authentication algorithms can then be executed using the user’s subscriber key 
Ki and original RAND to deliver the authentication response, RES, to the 3G AAA 
server. Encrypting a user’s authentication challenge with spatially related data 
successfully limits 3G user authentication to within the specified WLAN area only. This 
enhanced EAP-AKA procedure builds stronger 3G user authentication initiated from 
visited WLANs and limits the vulnerability of unauthorized access to 3G network 
services from WLANs. 
 
Several options exist for defining a 3G-WLAN user’s Area Descriptor, AD, or 
location to be used in an enhanced EAP-AKA algorithm. Simple geometric shapes such 
as ellipsoids or polygons, with a defined area of uncertainty, can be used to delimit a 
user’s login area. Real geo-coordinate data, or latitude and longitude, can designate the 
points necessary to create a user’s area descriptor, such as the central point for an 
ellipsoid or end points for a polygon. A relative coordinate system defined by a WLAN 
operator can be used to provide relative geo-coordinate data to define a user’s area 
descriptor or precise user location can be obtained via location algorithms implemented 
within WLANs in which beacons advertising the absolute coordinates of access points 
are used by receiving mobile equipment to calculate a current position. Alternatively, the 
WLAN operator can define regions or sub-areas within the WLAN coverage area and 
notify the user his/her assigned area. A 3G network is not capable of determining a user’s 
location coordinates at the precision required to bind a user authentication to a small 
WLAN network. Thus, data designating a user’s location can be forwarded to the 3G 
home network at the event of a user’s EAP-AKA authentication request from the WLAN 
AAA proxy. The 3G authentication challenge can then be encrypted using the spatially 
dependent data defining the user’s location. 
 
The primary obstacle to implementing spatial control for user authentication in 
3G-WLAN networks is that user privacy must be retained. Users of 3G services are not 
required to reveal their location to their network provider unlike mobile participants in 
private networks used for industry or government. A 3G user’s precise location 
coordinates can be obtained by the core network in the event of emergency E911 service 
request only. Otherwise, the home network is incapable of identifying a user’s location 
other than his/her current location area, LA/RA, which can range from over 50 to 100                                    
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                  Figure 15  EAP-AKA Protocol with Spatial Control  
 
square miles. A 3G subscriber possesses control of his location privacy and 3G security 
algorithms are designed to protect that privacy. Enforcing spatial authentication control 
for 3G-WLAN integrated networks must implement these specific restrictions to protect 
user privacy. 
  
Thus, the most feasible implementation of a spatially dependent EAP-AKA 
protocol requires that the 3G home network depend on user’s spatial coordinates sent 
from serving WLAN access networks. The 3G network must trust the spatial data 
provided for a user by the serving WLAN network when this enhanced EAP-AKA 
algorithm is used. The spatial EAP-AKA algorithm becomes more reliable when a trust 
relationship is defined and maintained between the 3G home network, HN, and serving 
WLAN network, SN.   
 
      Risks of Spatial Control in EAP-AKA Protocol 
 
Spatial control for 3G EAP-AKA user authentication is intended to mitigate abuse of 
illegal 3G network access from WLANs by limiting authorization to within the WLAN in 
which the user is present. Remote subscriber impersonation from anywhere on the 
Internet can be eliminated as a user is required to associate with a WLAN network before 
requesting 3G network access. The user’s authentication challenge is encrypted with his 
specific WLAN area descriptor requiring his physical presence within the WLAN. Spatial 
control for user authentication can be very powerful when unique sub-areas are defined 
for each WLAN user. Gaining access to a user’s authentication or other sensitive data 
becomes more difficult as the spatial key used for encryption becomes more complex and 
unique. The efficacy of spatially controlled user authentication increases as unique sub-
areas define users’ area descriptors. The 3G home network, however, has no means of 
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measuring the validity of geo-coordinates sent with a EAP-AKA request. Established 
subscriber privacy policies would be breeched if the 3G network verified the user’s 
location to the resolution required for the small visited WLAN area. The potential exists 
in spatially enhanced EAP-AKA, for an attacker to use false geo-spatial coordinates and 
still be authenticated to the 3G network. An attacker can mimic the functionality of a 
WLAN AAA proxy by sending the required EAP-AKA request to the 3G network with 
augmented spatial data. Thus, an ineffective step is added to the EAP-AKA protocol that 
does not protect 3G user authentication and can be readily abused by a dishonest party. 
The risks presented by a spatially enhanced EAP-AKA procedure include: 
 
? Unauthorized access from any IP network to the 3G network not prevented 
? Subscriber impersonation with false geo-coordinates accepted at the 3G network  
? False spatially augmented EAP-AKA requests originating from WLAN operator 
? Successful tracking of attacker’s real location eliminated  
 
It is not feasible, for instance, for the 3G home network to retain location characteristics 
of potentially visited WLANs. If geo-coordinates describing WLANs are stored 
persistently at the home network, the 3G operator could determine the proximity of 
received geo-coordinates to those stored and known for a given WLAN. However, this is 
a very inefficient approach to securing a spatially enhanced EAP-AKA protocol.  
 
For spatial control to be implemented successfully with the EAP-AKA protocol, 
attackers must be prevented from generating malicious or false authentication requests to 
the 3G network. Security mechanisms at the 3G home network and serving WLAN 
network should be implemented so that the integrity of authentication requests 
originating in WLANs can be determined. Falsified authentication requests should be 
identifiable to both the 3G home network and visited WLAN, and the 3G operator should 
be capable of assessing both the subscriber and the WLAN network. With positive 
verification of a EAP-AKA authentication request, access to rich 3G network resources 
can be granted. Conversely, with limited certainty as to the validity of an EAP-AKA 
authentication request, scaled down 3G network access can be granted. Spatially 
dependent EAP-AKA authentication requests become more secure as the 3G home 
network gains the capacity to measure the validity of each request. The interaction 
between 3G and WLAN networks must be used build the measure of trust held between 
parties. The 3G home network’s vulnerability to false authentication requests generated 
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Securing 3G-WLAN User Authentication 
 
      3G-WLAN Trust Model 
 
In a 3G-WLAN integrated network, it is essential that the parties involved build 
knowledge as to the behavior of the other participants. If relationships are defined 
between parties, the new integrated architecture and required authentication processes 
will be protected from potential abuse. To design a 3G-WLAN security solution, the trust 
relations between the home network, serving network and users must be identified. Two 
scenarios describe the trust relation between the home network and serving network. The 
home network may possess an existing relationship or agreement with the serving 
network and thus trusts the serving network. Otherwise, the serving network may not be 
trusted by the home network. It is essential in the latter case that the home network gains 
the capability of assessing a serving network to establish a trust relation. Maintaining an 
assessment of individual serving networks or an aggregate assessment of the operator of 
several serving networks will allow the 3G network to anticipate the quality of potential 
behavior of these otherwise unfamiliar networks. Requirements for interacting with a 
WLAN can then be aligned with the quality of trust the 3G operator possesses for the 
WLAN operator.  
 
An established relation exists between the home network and mobile subscriber 
and this trust relation can be readily quantified by the home network. Referencing the 
subscriber’s propensity for good behavior, a subscriber’s proper adherence to rules or 
payment deadlines can be used to establish the trust level held for the subscriber by the 
home network. Assessing subscriber behavior strengthens security policies designed to 
prevent potential abuse of untested 3G-WLAN integrated networks. The home network 
can potentially distrust a subscriber since the subscriber can act fiendishly or someone 
has impersonated him or hijacked his/her session. Thus it is possible that the home 
network can not trust either the serving network or subscriber, when 3G network access 
is requested from an unfamiliar serving network. This scenario is resolved by both 
parties, serving network and subscriber, being required to obtain area coordinates used to 
build the user’s area descriptors independently. The subscriber is not made aware of the 
spatial data sent to the home network on his behalf by the serving network. Thus the 
home network is protected with a successful authentication occurring only when the 
user’s coordinate data matches that sent by the serving network. Thus, if either party, the 
serving network or subscriber, is dishonest concerning spatial data, authentication to the 
3G network can not be completed. 
 
Finally, the serving network may not readily trust the subscribers within an access 
network. If 802.11X user authentication is performed, a trust relation exists between the 
serving network and subscriber. However, user authentication is not performed in all 
WLAN access networks, primarily public networks where convenience of Internet access 
is extended to customers. Procedures can be implemented by serving networks so to gain 
confidence of subscribers honestly participating in the WLAN.  Additionally, the home 
network must be confident of the validity of a subscriber’s authentication request 
originating from within a WLAN. Gaining confidence of a subscriber’s physical 
occupancy within a WLAN reduces the risks of 3G subscriber authentication requests 
being forged from the serving network. Gaining knowledge of a subscriber’s behavior 
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while visiting a WLAN also allows the 3G home network to assess a subscriber’s 
potential to commit or be thwarted into dishonest abuse of 3G service access. 
 
      Benefits of Ad-Hoc Serving Networks 
 
In a WLAN with a traditional fixed network infrastructure, a one-to-many 
relationship is built between the WLAN operator and each mobile subscriber. 
Relationships are built independently between the serving network and each user and the 
occupants are unaware of other participant’s activities or subscription level. However, 
assessing the behavior of mobile subscribers visiting serving networks is best built with 
first-hand knowledge obtained about subscribers. When a many-to-many relationship 
exists between subscribers, first-hand knowledge can be acquired from other WLAN 
participants observing and reporting information concerning their neighbors’ behavior or 
attendance. This many-to-many structure requires an ad-hoc network design in which 
nodes are aware of others’ communications and operate cooperatively to accomplish 
common networking tasks. Building secure relationships between 3G, WLAN network 
operators and subscribers is served by the establishment of ad-hoc networks implemented 
at WLANs. With subscribers aware of other’s behavior or participation within a serving 
network, more knowledge can be gained by the home network to determine the 
trustworthiness of serving networks and the validity of user authentication requests.  
 
With each subscriber providing observations in an ad-hoc serving network, a 
different localized trust model exists to define the level held by the serving network for 
each mobile subscriber. Relying on observations from one-hop neighbors, a subscriber 
can be trusted if k trusted nodes acknowledge the subscriber within a given time SCert [7].  
This trust level can be refined further by weighing each of the k acknowledgements 
according to the trust level T assigned to each observer. An observer’s trust level T can be 
revealed to neighbors through a certificate detailing the subscriber’s trust level. Trust 
certificates built by a 3G operator must reflect each subscriber’s historical good behavior 
and potential for future misbehavior. A process by which each subscriber’s trust 
certificate is refreshed at the event of good or bad behavior and as well re-assessed at 
fixed time intervals is required to build robust and accurate trust levels for subscribers. A 
3G network operator can calculate a base trust score based on the subscriber’s credit 
score plus adherence to his/her payment schedule. Any misbehavior, possibly determined 
from public state records such as computer abuse or fraud, can be used to deduct from a 
subscriber’s trust assessment. If a subscriber’s equipment becomes prone to loss or theft, 
this vulnerability can be integrated into the quality of trust maintained by his/her 
provider. With limited subscriber history, a subscriber’s trust certificate would initially 
start low, and would be incremented to reflect good behavior repeated over time. In an 
ad-hoc environment, mobile nodes will be required to advertise their trust certificate for 
the other participants either voluntarily or upon request. 
 
 Using the localized trust model for a ad-hoc serving networks in a 3G-WLAN 
integrated architecture, the presence of a mobile subscriber within a WLAN can be   
acknowledged by his neighbors. For instance, if each mobile node is required to 
periodically send a list of his/her neighbors to the serving network, the network can 
verify the presence of mobile subscribers within his network. The validity of neighbors’ 
acknowledgements of WLAN participants can be further weighed according to the trust 
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certificate obtained from each neighbor. With each mobile subscriber MSi possessing a 
trust level Ti of a real value between 0 … 1 that is reporting on node MSj, the 
trustworthiness of the set of acknowledgements becomes an aggregate of all the trust 
levels of the reporting nodes.  For a set of k nodes {MS1, MS2, MS3, MS4,…. MSk} 
reporting the participation of MSj, the probability of MSj residing in the serving network 
becomes  
    P = 1 – [(1 - T1) * (1 - T2) * (1 - T3)  …… * (1 - Tk)].         (3) 
 
Thus, the higher the trust level of the reporting nodes, the more credible the report or 
evidence to the serving network of a mobile subscriber’s presence. 
 
Ad-hoc serving networks are beneficial to 3G-WLAN internetworking since the 
serving and 3G networks can gain acknowledgement of the parties participating in a 
given WLAN and the misbehavior of participating nodes can be detected. Poor behaving 
nodes may attempt to take advantage of the access controls set up within a WLAN in 
order to ultimately gain access to a 3G network. The risk of impersonation or false 
advertisement of a user’s physical presence originating from a WLAN creates a threat to 
secure 3G network access. For instance, a group of dishonest users may attempt to feign 
the physical presence of another member by sending false acknowledgements of that 
member’s participation. If a false advertisement of a user’s WLAN participation is 
successful, an imposter may readily gain access to subscribed 3G services remotely. 
Thus, rigid access control within serving networks increases the overall security of 
integrated 3G-WLAN networks. Protocols within ad-hoc networks can be implemented 
by WLAN operators to identify impersonating or misbehaving nodes.  
 
      3G and Ad-Hoc WLAN Security Procedures  
 
            Authentication Acknowledgement  
 
Serving networks employing an ad-hoc network infrastructure can play an active 
role in preventing dishonest authentication requests from reaching the 3G home network. 
The trustworthiness of a 3G subscriber’s authentication request can be determined by the 
serving network if it requires that the request is acknowledged by k trusted observers 
from the WLAN. This mechanism would require all participant nodes overhearing an 
EAP-AKA identity response message relay that message back to the serving network. At 
the event of a mobile node’s response to an EAP-AKA identity request, the serving 
network can assess the viability of the user’s EAP-AKA response based on the set of 
acknowledgements received from neighboring nodes. The serving network can quantify 
the overall certainty of the user’s EAP-AKA response by assessing the trust certificates 
attached to each observer’s acknowledgement. Using threshold values R, for the number 
of acknowledgments received, and T, for the overall trust of the set of 
acknowledgements, the serving network can decide whether to forward the EAP-AKA  
authentication request for subscriber MSj to the 3G home network. Thus, if k nodes 
{MS1, MS2, MS3, …. MSk} with trust certificates {T1, T2, T3, … Tk} acknowledge the 
authentication request of MSj, if k > R  and 
 
          1 – [(1 - T1) * (1 - T2) * (1 - T3)  …… * (1 - Tk)] > T         (4) 
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the serving network will forward the authentication request of node MSj to the 3G home 
network. The trust level acquired for a user’s authentication request and the set of 


















            Figure 16   EAP-AKA Identity Response Acknowledgment 
 
Figure 17 shows the best value for k to meet the threshold T, of overall trust of the set of 
acknowledgments, for increasing minimum trust levels Tj of the acknowledging nodes. 
 
A potential vulnerability is presented when the serving network relies on a subset 
of participating node’s acknowledgements for a subscriber’s authentication request. If m 
dishonest nodes falsely acknowledge another member’s 3G authentication request, and m 
> R, the serving network is reliant on those m nodes’ false acknowledgements only. 
Honest nodes may not be aware of the m nodes’ false acknowledgements and cannot 
warn the serving network of the nodes’ dishonesty. Enforcing self-policing mechanisms 
involving all subscribers in a serving network can eliminate the potential for the m  
nodes’ dishonesty from being hidden from the other nodes. A shared task between all 
members in a serving network can be enforced such as the building and maintaining a 
current participants list. With mutual-exclusive access to the list, each node would be 
required to update his entry by either adding his ID and timestamp or updating the 
timestamp for his entry. Applying the assertion that all nodes in the network are not 
dishonest, if an attempt is made to falsify the participants list, this misbehavior will be 
detectable by other nodes. The node updating the list would broadcast the new size of the 
                                                          28

































                     
                        Figure 17   Acknowledgements Required for Trust Threshold T 
 
list to all nodes and then forward the list to a chosen neighbor. Priority would be given to 
neighbors without an entry in the list and then to the neighbor whose entry is the oldest. 
Message looping would be prevented by bypassing those neighbors that possessed the list 
most recently. Adhering to rules to verify the validity of the participants list, a node 
receiving the list can report any discrepancy found to the serving network. Rules include 
verifying that the most recent timestamp belongs to the last possessing node or that the 
length of the list is only incremented or decremented by one entry at each interval. 
Verification of the shared participant’s list prevents compromising nodes from 
interjecting false node IDs or timestamps into the list. Since the participants list is shared 
with all nodes, the list cannot be manipulated solely by the m dishonest nodes attempting 
to represent another dishonest party’s attendance or 3G authentication request. The 
reporting node can notify the serving network of the previous node that possessed the list 
to identify corruption or misbehavior on that node’s behalf. A range of corrective actions 
can be taken by the serving network to limit a questionable node’s participation in the 
network or possibly deny network access completely. The serving network can notify the 
3G home network of a node’s misbehavior and request a verification of the misbehaving 
node’s trust certificate. If the subscriber tampered with the certificate to include a false 
high trust level, the 3G home will be made aware of the subscriber’s poor behavior.  
 
Determining Trust in Serving Networks 
 
 In 3G-WLAN integration, the 3G operator must build robust trust assessments of 
the WLAN access networks potentially owned by different operators. The integration 
of 3G-WLAN networks requires that relationships between the 3G operators and WLAN 
serving networks be very well defined. The 3G home network must build an assessment 
per WLAN operator as to the potential of illegal 3G network access originating from that 
operator’s wireless network. According to how well the 3G operator rates the trust 
relationship with a WLAN owner, the 3G home network can enforce varying security 
policies for carrying out EAP-AKA user authentication and granting network access. 
With a significant number of small unknown WLAN operators providing 3G networks 
access, maintaining a level of trust in an operator is critical to the 3G home network.  
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A means of assessing a serving network’s proper operation and integrity must be 
obtainable to the 3G home network. Pre-existing relationships between 3G and WLAN 
operators, such as roaming agreements, would be the basis for initially quantifying the 
assessment of the 3G operator’s trust for a WLAN network. If no relationship between a 
3G and WLAN operator exists, the initial trust assessment must start low. A WLAN 
operator’s historical security performance can be incorporated into his assessment so to 
protect the 3G network from becoming victim to malicious activity initiating from the 
WLAN. Integrating historical data of past DoS attacks, weak user authentication, privacy 
or poor security performance into the calculation of WLAN operator’s trust level creates 
a realistic assessment for the operator. Similar to the trust relationship between a 3G 
operator and subscribers, the 3G operator’s quantified trust value of a serving network 
would evolve over time and be re-assessed after significant events. Without mishap or 
breach of legal 3G network access originating from a serving network over extended time 
periods, the 3G home network’s trust assessment of the serving network would increase 
to reflect the lack of potential vulnerability introduced to the home network by 
integrating with the WLAN. 
 
Several approaches exist for the 3G network to obtain information about the 
integrity of a serving network of which it possesses limited trust. The ad-hoc serving 
network structure allows the 3G home network to gain access to information or events 
that occur at the serving network. By requesting additional information from the 
subscribers in a serving network, the 3G home network can gain insight into the serving 
network’s performance. Particularly, at the event of an authentication request, the 3G 
home network can request acknowledgements from several authenticated subscribers or 
from a single, well trusted subscriber acting as a watchdog to verify the request from the 
new subscriber. The 3G home network can determine how reliable the serving network is 
at forwarding valid authentication requests on behalf of subscribers. To protect 3G 
services, when an EAP-AKA authentication request is received, the 3G home network 
can poll authenticated subscribers to verify a requestor’s presence before proceeding with 
authentication.  
 
By requesting acknowledgements from authenticated subscribers, a metric is 
established for the 3G home network to measure the level of trust, TSN, for a serving 
network's security performance. With each authentication request acknowledged from 
subscribers in a WLAN, the 3G home network gains evidence of the proper functionality 
of a serving network. The potential that a serving network does not enforce policies to 
identify dishonest nodes and forwards fraudulent authentication requests becomes a threat 
to secure 3G network access. The risk also exists that a serving network AAA proxy may 
create fraudulent authentication requests on the behalf of dishonest parties. 
Acknowledging authentication requests from authenticated subscriber node’s within a 
WLAN will minimize these threats posed to the 3G home network. By verifying the 
validity of authentication requests, the 3G network becomes less vulnerable to illegal 
access attempts initiated from the WLAN.  
 
Overhead is introduced into 3G-WLAN internetworking as the level of trust held 
for a serving network is measured over time. With limited trust for a serving network's 
proper functionality, the number of requests by the 3G home network to acknowledge 
authentications would be at its highest. The overhead introduced is defined by the size of 
















the acknowledgment messages sent to the 3G home network and the number of messages 
requested by the home network for each authentication. Thus, if an acknowledgment 
contains an observing subscriber's identity and the acknowledged EAP identity response 
generated by a new subscriber, overhead of each authentication is equivalent to the size 
of the message, M, multiplied by the number of requests, N, made by the home network, 
or N * sizeof(M). This overhead is incurred at each new authentication request 
originating from a visited WLAN and is ultimately dependent on the number of 
acknowledgements required by the home network. For serving networks with a low TSN, 
certainty as to the validity of an authentication request is increased with a high value of 
N. Thus, the overhead incurred by subscribers in a poorly trusted WLAN will be the 
highest. The trust level held for a serving network, TSN, can be incremented according to 
the number of successfully authentication requests positively acknowledged by 
subscribers in the visited WLAN.  With subsequent successful authentications occurring 
for a serving network and a higher TSN, the number of acknowledgements requested from 
the home network can be decreased. With the level of trust in a WLAN increasing, the 
incurred overhead by acknowledging subscribers will begin to diminish. 
 
 The range of values defining TSN is configurable by the 3G operator as well as the 
metrics used to change the value of TSN over time. For example, a 3G operator may 
determine that 100 acknowledged authentications are required in an average sized 
WLAN to increment TSN, that ranges from 0 to 1, by .05 points. If a maximum number of 
10 acknowledgements is required initially from the WLAN with a TSN equal to 0, and the 
acknowledgement message size is 10 bytes, each authentication will add an initial 100 
bytes of added data transmission on the part of the observing subscribers. As the total 
number of acknowledged authentications originating from a WLAN increases, TSN will 
also increase. With higher trust in a serving network’s integrity, the 3G operator may 
decrease the required number of acknowledgements requested for the WLAN as follows: 
 
            TSN                   Acknowledgements 
                              0 <  TSN  < .30           10 
                                  .30 < TSN  < .50           7 
                                 .50 < TSN  < .70           4 
                                 .70 < TSN  < .80                  2 
                                 .80 < TSN  < 1.0           1 
 
                  












                 Figure 18      Increase of TSN as Acknowledged Authentications Increase 























Figure 18 demonstrates in this scenario how TSN changes as the total number of 
acknowledged authentications increases over time. Figure 19 shows the reduction in 
















                     Figure 19   Overhead Decreases with Acknowledged Authentications                                        
 
Conversely, if repeated invalid authentication requests originate from a serving 
network, the trust level held for the serving network will be decremented by the 3G 
operator. Any possible events that originate from a WAN that cause a negative impact on 
the 3G network should be well defined by the 3G operator and reflected in the level of 
trust for a WLAN. A denial of service attack initiated from a WLAN that prevents access 
to 3G services will be reflected in the 3G network’s trust assessment of the WLAN. Any 
abuse of a subscriber’s authentication credentials such as impersonation originating from 
a WLAN will impact that network’s trust level. If an attacker manipulates the 3G 
charging mechanism by interjecting excess packets at the WLAN the 3G network will act 
to protect itself from potential negative impact. According to the degree of severity of the 
impact to 3G network security, limited access to the 3G network can be granted and the 
3G network can continue to request data from trusted, observing nodes in a WLAN.  
 
             
                         Figure 20   TSN Decreases with Negative Events in WLAN 
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Figure 20 shows the impact of unacknowledged authentications occurring at a WLAN on 
that serving network’s TSN where at t3 a DoS event drives the WLAN’s TSN down by .30 
points and between t4 and t5, repeated unacknowledged authentication requests drive TSN 
down .15 points.  
 
The 3G home network’s acceptance of the data forwarded from a WLAN will be 
impacted by the trust certificates held by the forwarding subscribers. For instance, if 
subscribers MSA and MSB, with trust levels TA and TB, are polled by the 3G home 
network as to the presence of node MSC, the 3G home network can accept the observer’s 
reports if the aggregate trust of the observing nodes is greater than the acceptable 
threshold TW, or 1 – [(1- TA) * (1 - TB)] > TW. With deficient aggregate trust for the 
information received from a serving network, authentication requests can be denied from 
the 3G network or access to only limited 3G services can be granted. Trust levels for both 
subscribers, TA and TB, and the serving network, TSN, must be considered when the 3G 
home network analyzes the acknowledgements obtained. So, if TAuth is the home 
network’s minimum required certainty that the authentication request was issued from the 
serving network and 
 
                1 – [(1 - TA) * (1 - TB) * (1 - TSN)] > TAuth           (5) 
 
an authentication vector for MSC can be sent to the serving network.  Figure 1d shows the 
required level of trust in observing nodes for serving network of differing trust levels, 
TSN, needed to gain the overall certainty, TAuth, for a valid authentication request. 
By building an assessment of trust for serving networks, the 3G home network can 
protect itself from lax or dishonest serving network proxies. If the serving network 
voluntarily notifies the 3G home network of misbehavior occurring in the WLAN, the 
decrement of trust assessment for the serving network should not be as severe. The 3G 
home network can continue to monitor the behavior of serving networks until a threshold 
of trust is reached and initiate methods to minimize fraudulent network access originating 
from serving networks. 
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                               Figure 21   Required Trust in Observing Nodes for TSN 
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Illegal access to the 3G home network from a visited WLAN can also be 
identified if a communication path is enforced between a 3G AAA server and 
VLR/SGSN for each location area. If a AAA server queries the VLR/SGSN as to the 
active status of a subscriber within the location area in which a serving network resides, 
invalid EAP-AKA authentication requests can be detected. Thus, a one-to-one 
relationship should exist between an AAA server and location area or VLR/SGSN.  A 
restriction can be placed on EAP-AKA initiated authentication requests in that a 3G 
subscriber must currently be authenticated via the radio access network and be active 
within the location area in which a visited WLAN resides. This methodology provides a 
verification method for the 3G home network to determine the validity of EAP-AKA 
authentication requests. If an authentication request originates from a serving WLAN 
network which is not contained within a subscriber’s active location area, the 3G network 
can consider the request invalid and thus adjust the serving network’s trust assessment. A 
decreased trust assessment would reflect the possible dishonesty of the serving network 
or the potential for the serving network AAA proxy to be manipulated from an outside 
malicious party to generate false authentication requests. This communication path 
enforced between a 3G AAA server and VLR/SGSN is most warranted when additional 
subscribers are not present in a visited WLAN to acknowledge the authentication request  
of a new subscriber. An initial check by the 3G AAA server that a user is active within 
the VLR/SGSN location area in which the WLAN resides is a precautionary method that 
can protect the 3G home network. Otherwise, the 3G network can implement steps to 
protect itself from the potentially malicious network access.  
 
Protecting 3G Network Services 
 
Precautions can be taken by the 3G operator when granting network access to 
subscribers in a WLAN in which an insufficient trust relationship has been established. 
Added security procedures and restrictions on service access can be used to minimize the 
possible abuse of 3G network access. Threat of abuse of 3G network services increases 
with the level of services and access offered to visitors of unknown wireless LANs. 
Potential guards to protect the 3G home network include: 
 
     -  further encrypting user authentication challenge 
     -  limiting the number of subscriber connections from a WLAN 
     -  limiting service suite accessible from a WLAN 
 
Additional encryption of an authentication challenge sent via EAP-AKA transport to a 
non-trusted serving network can further protect the 3G network from intrusion. Advanced 
encryption can be accomplished by the 3G home network by XORing an authentication 
challenge with the user’s equipment serial number, PIN or password. This additional 
protection of subscriber authentication vectors protects the 3G network from the 
vulnerability of subscriber impersonation. The authentication and key management field, 
AMF, appended to the network authentication value, AUTN, used by the subscriber 
equipment to authenticate the 3G network, can be set to indicate to the user that 
additional encryption has been exercised. This approach is highly beneficial when the 3G 
home network interacts with a WLAN in which no existing relationship or trust index has 
been determined. With no pre-existing trust for a newly visited WLAN, the 3G home 
network’s determination of the credibility of authentication requests becomes dependent 
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on the input of other subscribers. If no other authenticated subscriber is present in the 
WLAN, a sole subscriber can not be authenticated. Rather than denying subscriber 
authentication, the 3G home network can execute additional encryption protecting its 
services and the subscriber. The 3G home network may also enforce a quota on the 
concurrent subscriber connections allowed from a visited WLAN to mitigate potential 
network access abuse. Additional attribute value pairs defined for the DIAMETER 
capabilities exchange can define the size of a serving network based on its capacity or 
total possible number of user connections.  
 
Further protection of the 3G network resources can be implemented by limiting 
the types of services accessible from visited WLANs. Limiting access to rich multimedia 
services will protect the 3G network from abuse, while access to simple services, such as 
text based messaging and limited Internet access, can be maintained to provide basic 
functionality to subscribers. Access to different classes of services can be assigned to 
subscribers within a WLAN according to the trust level held for the WLAN operator or 
according to the level of certainty held by the 3G home network of a subscriber’s valid 
authentication request. Voice, data and multimedia services are classed into four groups 
by 3GPP according to the level of bandwidth required and the sensitivity of the content to 
delay in delivery or re-transmission. Background services include minimal bandwidth to 
provide e-mail, text messaging and limited downloads while interactive services allow 
larger downloads for video or files, web browsing and potential server access such as to 
database servers. Streaming services emerging for wireless customers include streaming 
video or music on demand and webcasts. These services are delay sensitive, require 
prioritization to deliver continuous content and require significant bandwidth. Voice over 
IP, VoIP, and interactive conferencing or video are emerging streaming services for 
mobile customers. The final 3GPP service class is the conversational class for voice or 
video telephony. With services categorized into these classes, access to each class of 
service can be granted according to rules set by the 3G home network. For instance, for 
WLANs in which the 3G home network possesses only 30% of allowable trust level, TSN, 
access to background and traditional telephony services can be provided. For trust levels 
ranging between 30% and 60%, interactive services access can be granted, while for 
WLANs in which he 3G home network possess above 60% certainty of operational 
integrity and valid user authentication, premium streaming services can be made 
accessible. Providing access to premium 3G services is a benefit for WLAN operators 
that can increase their overall number of clientele and market reach. Thus, granting tiered 
service access to WLAN serving networks builds motivation for operators to build strong 
trust relationships with 3G networks and minimize any potential abuse that could 
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Conclusion 
 
 Focus on converging 3G and IP technologies has centered on the integration of 
3G and wireless LAN networks. High-speed 3G data service can be delivered to 
customers through WLAN networks giving customers more mobility and access to 
critical data. Standards have been defined to secure an efficient means of allowing 
seamless 3G service access from WLAN serving networks. Architectural options have 
been defined to connect 3G and WLAN networks either through dual network hardware 
or through the transport of 3G services over the IP network. All aspects of 3G subscriber 
management, including authentication, must be accurately implemented for the 
successful deployment of 3G-WLAN integrated networks. In hybrid 3G-WLAN 
networks, securing 3G user authentication initiated from a WLAN is particularly crucial. 
The 3G home network must be protected from forged authentication requests and 
unauthorized access. Dishonest WLANs or those vulnerable to outside malicious parties 
attempting to manipulate the hybrid 3G-WLAN environment to gain illegal 3G network 
access must be identified and thwarted. 
 
3G-WLAN integrated networks can be secured by the implementation of ad-hoc 
network architecture in visited WLANs. By gaining access to subscriber’s observations 
within a serving network, both the serving network and 3G home network can enforce 
policies to reveal dishonest participants. Steps can be taken to measure the level of 
dishonest activity occurring in a serving network and to mitigate abuse of 3G network 
access. For instance, serving networks can act as firewalls on the behalf of 3G networks 
filtering incredible authentication requests not acknowledged properly from observing 
WLAN participants. Authentication procedures can be further strengthened by 
information forwarded to the 3G home network on behalf of a subscriber by the serving 
network or other trusted subscribers present. Spatial control of 3G user authentication can 
be implemented so to bind user authentication to the WLAN he/she is currently residing 
in. With limited authority to verify a subscriber’s accurate location within a WLAN 
beyond the range of the subscriber’s current location area, LA, the 3G home network 
becomes reliant on serving networks to send valid authentication requests and user spatial 
data. Thus, robust trust relationships must be strictly defined and maintained between 3G 
operators and potentially visited WLANs. Subscriber authentication can be made 
contingent on the level of trust held by the 3G home network for the visited serving 
network and the certainty of the subscriber’s presence at the WLAN. Proper performance 
and repeated successful authentication requests originating from the WLAN will deem 
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